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Abstract There has been a burst of work in the last couple of decades on
mechanistic explanation, as an alternative to the traditional covering-law model
of scientific explanation. That work makes some interesting claims about mech-
anistic explanations rendering phenomena ‘intelligible’, but does not develop
this idea in great depth. There has also been a growth of interest in giving an
account of scientific understanding, as a complement to an account of expla-
nation, specifically addressing a three-place relationship between explanation,
world, and the scientific community. The aim of this paper is to use the con-
textual theory of scientific understanding to build an account of understanding
phenomena using mechanistic explanations. This account will be developed
and illustrated by examining the mechanisms of supernovae, which will allow
synthesis of treatment of the life sciences and social sciences on the one hand,
where many accounts of mechanisms were originally developed, and treatment
of physics on the other hand, where the contextual theory drew its original
inspiration.
Keywords: Understanding; mechanisms; mechanistic explanation; the con-
textual theory of scientific understanding; intelligibility; supernovae; SN1987A.
1 Introduction: What is the question?
There are two important areas of debate in philosophy of science which both
concern intelligible explanations, but are not yet connected. First, various au-
thors in the mechanisms literature claim that good mechanistic explanations are
‘intelligible’, although they do not say much about what this means. Accounts
of mechanistic explanation have been developed over the last two decades in a
literature that provided an alternative to covering law explanation, and primar-
ily studied cases from the life sciences. Secondly, over the last decade there has
been an emergence of interest in characterising scientific understanding, where
that is explicitly conceived of as an attempt to elucidate a three-place rela-
tion between world, explanation, and the scientific community (see papers in
de Regt et al. (2009), and de Regt (2017)). Mieke Boon summarises the view
the three-place approach is reacting to:
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[M]ost authors reject it [understanding] as a notion of philosophical
interest because they assume that it is a mere psychological surplus
of explaining. . . . The tradition in which Trout rejects the impor-
tance of scientific understanding presupposes that a philosophical
account of science can be explicated in terms of a two-placed rela-
tion between world and knowledge. (Boon, 2009, p250.)
The idea is that previous treatment of understanding has largely either consid-
ered it to be little more than possession of, beliefs about, or perhaps communica-
tion of, an explanation,1 or considered it to be a purely subjective and not very
important phenomenological state—leaving no space for any substantive and
scientifically important account of understanding.2 The views I will examine
reject this. Specifically, in one of the first papers in this tradition, ‘A contex-
tual approach to scientific understanding’, de Regt and Dieks (2005) claim that
intelligibility is a value that scientists in a particular community at a particular
time confer on theories they can use. De Regt and Dieks draw paradigm cases
from physics, but philosophers such as Leonelli (2009), who is also approaching
understanding in broadly this way, draws ideas from the life sciences.
In this paper, I will apply the contextual theory to the understanding of phe-
nomena gained from mechanistic explanations. This account will be developed
by discussing our mechanistic understanding of the phenomenon of supernovae,
specifically following SN1987A, spotted in 1987 and still one of the most impor-
tant supernovae ever studied. Consider the following claim from Nature at the
end of 1987:
‘The neutrinos detected from the recent supernova 1987A (SN1987A)
in the Large Magellanic Cloud by two large water Cerenkov detectors
run by collaborations at Kamiokande and at IMB confirm dramat-
ically our understanding of the generic mechanism of formation of
type II supernovae: the gravitational collapse of a massive stellar
core to form a neutron star or black hole.’ (Walker, 1987, p609.)
Illari and Williamson (2012) have already argued that the mechanisms of su-
pernovae fit the core three-part account of mechanisms and mechanistic expla-
nation that is becoming consensus in the mechanisms literature: ‘A mechanism
for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such a way
that they are responsible for the phenomenon.’ (Illari and Williamson, 2012,
p120.) Illari and Williamson explain how this consensus account captures work
of many major mechanists, and so I will use this account to build an account
of understanding phenomena mechanistically. This will allow me to address
1For recent work that takes this kind of approach, see Strevens (2009); Potochnik (2011).
For extended defence of this view, see Khalifa (2012, 2015), and for criticism see Newman
(2014). Khalifa thinks the skill condition in de Regt’s work is either unnecessary or trivial.
It will become clear that I hold it to be both necessary and substantive, as I argue for this
extensively, thoroughly agreeing with Newman (2014) that scientific understanding requires a
significant amount of non-propositional knowledge not captured by logical relations.
2In current work, most notably Trout (2002).
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the enormous variety of things that are done in explaining supernovae mecha-
nistically, and to tease out two things in this story: first, the place of entities
and activities, and, second, the interdependent nature of our understanding of
mechanisms, models, and more basic physical theory.3
I will begin, in section 2, by bringing the claims of mechanists together with
the contextual theory of scientific understanding to build a theoretical account
of understanding phenomena using mechanistic explanations, and setting up
some interesting questions that arise about virtues of mechanistic explanations.
In section 3, I will develop this account by applying it to understanding the
mechanisms of supernovae. It will turn out that the mechanisms of supernovae
are particularly interesting for this purpose, as they enable a creative synthesis
between the use of enormously general theories, and the use of multiple models,
even down to multiple models of a particular supernova: SN1987A. As a teaser,
consider the following from an astrophysics textbook:
‘Astrophysics does not deal with a special, distinct class of effects
and processes, as do the basic fields of physics. ... astrophysics deals
with complex phenomena, which involve processes of many different
kinds. It has to lean, therefore, on all the branches of physics, and
this makes for its special beauty. The theory of the structure and
evolution of stars presents a unique opportunity to bring separate,
seemingly unconnected physical theories under one roof.’ (Prialnik,
2010, p28-9.)
Section 3 will show that understanding mechanistic explanations of type II su-
pernovae requires modelling activities, entities and their organization in a way
that requires distinctively mechanistic modes of virtues. It further requires a
surrounding architecture of at least theories and laws, models and simulations:
in this case at least our understanding of theory and mechanisms are interde-
pendent. I will finish by drawing some wider conclusions, in section 4, reflecting
on what this means for the contextual theory of scientific understanding.
2 Understanding phenomena
In this section I will apply the contextual theory of scientific understanding to
develop an account of understanding mechanistic explanations of phenomena,
before going on in section 3 to apply the account to SN1987A.
2.1 Intelligible mechanisms
The new mechanist literature arose alongside the realisation that traditional
philosophy of science, focusing primarily on laws and theories, had limited ap-
3I will not address how scientific knowledge is held in society, nor will I treat intelligibility
historically (for an excellent book see Dear (2006)). Note finally that I am not directly
addressing the ontic-epistemic debate concerning mechanistic explanation (see Illari (2013)),
but providing an account of understanding phenomena mechanistically that I think could in
principle be used by both sides of the ontic-epistemic divide.
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plication to the life sciences, which study a domain that is considerably more
local and diverse than some areas of physics. Although the biggest burst of work
was only initiated by Machamer, Darden and Craver’s famous paper (Machamer
et al., 2000, now commonly known as ‘MDC’), the mechanisms literature has
become very influential. While there has been a great deal of progress on what a
mechanistic explanation is, there has been little on what it means to understand
a mechanism, or to understand a phenomenon mechanistically.4
In addressing the question of understanding or intelligibility, I hope to show
here a different mode for the development of many of the ideas concerning
representation and communication of mechanistic explanations currently of in-
terest. Ideas bearing on understanding actually arose early in the mechanisms
literature. MDC write: ‘Descriptions of mechanisms render the end stage in-
telligible by showing how it is produced by bottom out entities and activities.’
(Machamer et al., 2000, p21.) For MDC, what they call ‘bottom out’ activities
and entities are those which are regarded as unproblematic by a scientific field
at a particular time. They say that in molecular biology bottom-out activities
are generally those of macromolecules, smaller molecules, and ions. These activ-
ities are usually geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, energetic, or electro-
magnetic (Machamer et al., 2000, p14). Scientists in the field see no need to
explain these activities further, although of course they may be targets of expla-
nations in other fields. We will see that the bottom-out entities and activities
of supernovae vary widely.
Although intelligibility is not their primary concern, MDC mention it often
(pp 3, 12, 21-23). It is fairly clear that they take mechanistic explanations to
be intelligible in a way in which explanations subsuming the phenomenon under
a covering law are not. The idea is that unlike laws, mechanisms explain how
the phenomenon is produced, by identifying the entities and their activities that
are responsible for the phenomenon, often laying out stages in that production.
They write: ‘Productive continuities are what make the connections between
stages intelligible.’ (Machamer et al., 2000, p3.) It is important to MDC that
these connections be uninterrupted: ‘In a complete description of mechanism,
there are no gaps that leave specific steps unintelligible; the process as a whole
is rendered intelligible in terms of entities and activities that are acceptable
to a field at a time.’ (Machamer et al., 2000, p12.) So bottom out entities
and activities are regarded as the stopping place for mechanistic explanations
generated by that field at that time, since they are regarded as needing no further
explanation, although this can change over time, and such entities and activities
may be targets of explanation in other fields. This is related to mechanistic
explanations being in some sense continuous. Secondly, MDC also clearly think
that mechanisms offer an intelligible explanation in a way in which regularities
do not. They write:
4Work sometimes bears on this obliquely, such as the debate about whether mechanisms
are ontic (the mechanism itself explains (Craver, 2012)), or epistemic (some form of description
of the mechanism explains (Wright and Bechtel, 2007; Wright, 2012)). In Illari (2013) I have
attempted to argue that this disagreement is not so deep as it appears.
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‘We should not be tempted to follow Hume and later logical em-
piricists into thinking that the intelligibility of activities (or mech-
anisms) is reducible to their regularity. Descriptions of mechanisms
render the end stage intelligible by showing how it is produced by
bottom out entities and activities. To explain is not merely to re-
describe one regularity as a series of several.’ (Machamer et al.,
2000, pp 21-2.)
These two claims are not surprising given the view popular within the mecha-
nisms literature that mechanistic explanation is a much-needed alternative to
laws-explanation, but a final claim is more striking in that context. For MDC,
understanding is not an ontic matter, in the sense of Salmon (1998). They write:
‘The understanding provided by a mechanistic explanation may be
correct or incorrect. Either way, the explanation renders a phe-
nomenon intelligible. Mechanism descriptions show how possibly,
how plausibly, or how actually things work. Intelligibility arises not
from an explanation’s correctness, but rather from an elucidative
relation between the explanans (the set-up conditions and interme-
diate entities and activities) and the explanandum (the termination
condition or the phenomenon to be explained).’ (Machamer et al.,
2000, p21.)5
They seem open to an account of understanding that is independent, then, of
the influential insistence of Salmon on the need for ontic explanations, to cap-
ture causal explanation. Notice that the intelligibility they are concerned with
seems to be of both the mechanism itself, and thereby also of the phenomenon
explained.
I lack space to examine even major figures in the mechanisms literature such
as Bechtel (2007) and Glennan (2017) in depth, but I hope that it is at least
plausible that MDC’s group of concerns extends more widely within that litera-
ture. For example, Bechtel, falling firmly on the side of epistemic explanations,
is not likely to disagree. Nevertheless, after this fascinating beginning, major
mechanists say little more about intelligibility directly.
MDC do not themselves return to the idea to give an account of how
such bottom out activities and entities yield intelligibility. But since they cite
Anscombe (1975) as the source of ideas concerning activities and causality, it is
not unreasonable to suppose that they believe that the Anscombian ‘thick causal
terms’ that MDC call activities—such as binding, bonding, and folding—are in-
tuitively more intelligible to us than the ‘thin’ and relatively uninformative
concept of causality itself (Bogen, 2008). So a reasonable interpretation of what
5It is difficult to classify MDC clearly as holding an ontic or an epistemic view of mech-
anistic explanation. Craver has extensively defended the ontic conception (Craver, 2012),
while Darden and Machamer have remained largely silent, although many of their comments,
particularly in the MDC paper, seem to suggest an ontic view. While the comments from the
MDC paper that I have quoted above read as epistemic, they seem to concern intelligibility,
rather than mechanistic explanation itself.
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they mean is that the understanding of activity-terms and entity-terms gives
scientists a grasp of what is happening, in a way in which describing using very
abstract concepts such as causality—or laws—does not.
On this view, for example, we manage to explain a phenomenon such as
protein synthesis in terms of the chemical binding and bonding already known
to the field, thus yielding a grasp of what MDC call the productive continu-
ity of the whole mechanism. However, there are questions to ask about how
and why the complete explanation yields understanding. In extensive work on
mechanism discovery, Bechtel, Craver, and Darden have all produced work that
has implications for this issue, but do not synthesize it to address intelligibility
directly (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010; Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2010; Craver,
2007; Darden, 2006, 2002). I contribute to that broader project, but using the
contextual theory of scientific understanding.
In section 3, I will show, first, that what counts as bottom-out entities and
activities for supernovae are varied, secondly, that what counts as productive
continuity or gaps in a mechanistic explanation in astrophysics can be var-
ied, but we can identify some recognisable ones, and, nevertheless, mechanistic
explanations (alongside many other things) are needed to give an intelligible
explanation of supernovae.
2.2 Understanding theories
Before that, I need to examine the contextual theory of scientific understanding,
which arose in a different literature, within a movement rejecting the idea that
explanation can be fully characterised as a two-place relationship between an
explanation and the world (see de Regt et al. (2009)). de Regt and Dieks
(2005) primarily draw cases from physics, and, in that context, one reason the
question of understanding arose is because of the apparent unintelligibility of
theories such as quantum mechanics, which seem to require a counterintuitive
and mind-boggling effort to grasp.
According to the contextual theory of scientific understanding, intelligibility
is a value that scientists in a particular community at a particular time project
onto theories that they can use (de Regt and Dieks, 2005; de Regt, 2009a, 2014,
2017). In defending this account, de Regt and Dieks (2005) first dissociate sci-
entific understanding from the feeling or ‘sense’ of understanding rejected by
many philosophers of science, notably Trout (2002), as being too purely subjec-
tive to be an aim of science. For example, de Regt writes: ‘I do agree with Trout
that the phenomenology of understanding has no epistemic function: the expe-
rience of a feeling of understanding (an “aha” experience) is neither necessary
nor sufficient for scientific understanding of a phenomenon.’ (de Regt, 2009a,
p25.) I suspect that a substantive account of a phenomenology of understand-
ing might go considerably beyond the relatively simple ‘sense of understanding’
(Trout, 2002) which de Regt and Dieks are rejecting, and so have some very
interesting epistemic functions.6 However, I will focus on the positive claim of
6Which may involve aesthetics: for one argument, see Kosso (2002).
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the contextual theory, with which I agree: that usability is more substantive
than a purely subjective and individual feeling of understanding.7
De Regt and Dieks argue that scientists must be able to use theories to
construct and evaluate explanations in a way that is essential to the epistemic
aims of science, and cannot be supposed to be a mere pragmatic afterthought
to the ‘real explanation’. For de Regt and Dieks, understanding a phenomenon
requires having the skills to use the theory of that phenomenon. Theories have
virtues, and they mention as examples visualisability and simplicity (de Regt
and Dieks, 2005, p142), but these virtues are relative to the skills that scientists
have to use the theories. Theories are regarded as intelligible when they have a
(or the) cluster of virtues that allows scientists to use them. These skills cannot
be acquired purely from textbooks, but need practice, because skills cannot—or
cannot all—be translated into an explicit set of rules. Since these skills are
essential to the construction and evaluation of explanations, which are essential
to the epistemic aims of science, epistemic and pragmatic aspects of explanation
are not separable in practice, in spite of being analytically distinguishable. So an
account of the epistemic aims of science cannot ignore understanding. De Regt
and Dieks accept the implication that theories cannot be uniquely dependent
on a direct evidential relation to the phenomena they explain. Note that if they
are right, then we have not really given a full account of explanation until we
address the aspects of usability that yield understanding. This means that an
account of what it is for mechanistic explanations to be intelligible is a more
urgent part of an account of mechanistic explanation than might have initially
appeared.
So on this view the intelligibility of a theory is contextual because it is rela-
tive to the skills of a community of scientists at a time, in a way that goes beyond
an individual, subjective feeling of understanding. De Regt and Dieks address a
possible wish for objective features of explanation by suggesting that we could
still more-or-less-objectively test for understanding. They suggest one test or
indicator of usability of a theory, and so of it intelligibility, is scientists’ ability
to recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of the theory without per-
forming exact calculations. They call this ‘CIT’ (de Regt and Dieks, 2005), and
their discussion makes it clear that they are trying to use CIT to capture the
case where, in using a theory, scientists progress from being able to use a theory
to make accurate calculations that don’t make a lot of sense to them, to coming
to have a ‘feel’ for the theory. According to this view, intelligibility is relative
to a scientific community at a time, but is crucial to scientific explanation, as
it is important to the fruitfulness of scientific theories. De Regt writes more
recently: ‘So intelligibility is a measure of the fruitfulness of a theory, but it is
a contextual measure: a theory can be fruitful for scientists in one context and
7Note also that what Trout seems to have in mind is a mental state. Now, on a traditional
understanding of mental states, they involve qualitative or phenomenal feel, while use might
or might not involve phenomenal feel. However, the rise of externalist views of mental states,
and particularly the flourishing literature on embodied, enactive and distributed cognition,
has a lot in common with the view I am advocating. See Ylikoski (2014) and Toon (2015) for
direct application of this view to understanding.
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less so for scientists in other contexts.’ (de Regt, 2014, p381.)
Since the contextual theory offers an account of understanding phenomena
with intelligible theories, with one test being the shift from quantitative use to
qualitative understanding, the application to the intelligibility of mechanistic
explanations and so understanding the phenomena they explain is not yet clear.
Nevertheless there is much of interest here. As a route to synthesising the two
approaches, it is important that de Regt later makes it even clearer that he
takes CIT to be one indicator among others: ‘There may be different ways to
test whether a theory is intelligible for scientists, and not all of them may be
applicable in all cases or for all disciplines.’ (de Regt, 2009a, p32.) He suggests
a theory might also be considered intelligible if it can be used to build models,
and his current work focuses on this.
I shall not attempt to provide tests of intelligibility, objective or not. What
I will be focusing on is the importance of scientists’ abilities to use mechanistic
explanations to the epistemic aims of science. However, in section 3 we will
see that even understanding a theory might require very much more than CIT,
ranging over building models, mechanistic explanations, and application to a
case (SN1987A) to gain empirical evidence.
2.3 Understanding phenomena with intelligible mechanis-
tic explations
I will here finish the theoretical merging of the contextual theory of scientific
understanding with work on mechanistic explanation to develop and defend the
view that:
A phenomenon is mechanistically understood when scientists have
an intelligible mechanistic explanation for the phenomenon; i.e. a
mechanistic explanation that they can use.8
I argue here that these two approaches can go together, and that their com-
bination raises some interesting questions. Mechanistic explanations are usu-
ally directly of a phenomenon, where in places the contextual theory offers
an account of understanding a phenomenon, using a theory (de Regt, 2009a,
p251). Laws and theories are not usually given the same kind of importance
in mechanistic explanation, but we will see their importance in understanding
supernovae.
Notice that for MDC, if a mechanistic explanation is intelligible, the phe-
nomenon it explains is also thereby intelligible. de Regt and Dieks (2005) focus
on the intelligibility of theories, as the way in which we understand phenom-
ena. However, de Regt (2009b), having made a careful distinction, then writes:
‘Understanding in the sense of UP (having an appropriate explanation of the
phenomenon) is an epistemic aim of science, but this aim can be achieved only
8Note that I don’t claim mechanistic explanation is the only form of explanation in the life
sciences, nor does my account require a specific account of mechanistic explanation, so long
as it accepts the importance of parts and what the parts do, as I will show.
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by means of pragmatic understanding UT (the ability to use the relevant the-
ory).’ (de Regt, 2009b, p.591-2) I agree with both MDC and de Regt that we
can talk of understanding phenomena, and of understanding theory, particularly
when we appreciate the full complexity of scientific practice, which will emerge
in the case of SN1987A in Section 3. However, to keep things clear, I will write
of understanding phenomena using intelligible mechanistic explanations.
In spite of considerable surface differences, the two approaches can be aligned.
In accord with the contextual theory, the usability of a mechanistic explanation
goes beyond a simple feeling of a ‘sense of understanding’. On this view, we can
think of mechanistic explanations as having virtues. However, the intelligibility
of a mechanistic explanation is not intrinsic to it, but projected onto it by the
community of scientists who can use it, for the purposes of their practice. This
use is essential for the success of their practice, their epistemic aims, but it is
dependent on the skills of scientists.
A significant difference between laws explanation and mechanistic explana-
tion is the importance of parts. Bechtel and Richardson (2010) suggested very
early in the new mechanist literature that the mark of mechanistic explanation is
the heuristic strategies of decomposition and localisation, which concern parts.
However, they now offer other heuristics, so I suggest we turn instead to the
simpler: ‘Mechanistic explanation is inherently componential.’ (Craver, 2007,
p131.) Note that all major mechanists recognise both what I shall call entities
(the parts themselves) and activities (what the parts do), following Machamer
et al. (2000); Illari and Williamson (2012). I have explained in section 2.1 that
MDC take these to be crucial to intelligibility. But there is enormous variation
in entities and activities studied in current work, and indeed parts have rarely
been rigidly defined and restricted even in the history of mechanism, which is
lengthy and rich. (Nicholson, 2012, p.454 also notes this.)
Thinkers such as Descartes, often considered a paradigmatically reductive
mechanist, actually have more complex views than they are often presented as
having. Descartes often writes about parts in his explanations, or what the
mechanisms literature now calls entities, but the parts Descartes uses in his
explanations are not all like little particles. Some of the most famous parts
Descartes writes about are the fluid ‘animal spirits’ of his account of reflexes
(Roux, 2017, p.64). Barnaby Hutchins argues that, while the received view of
Descartes’ mechanicism comes from his physics, such as his treatment of light,
Descartes’ physiology is notably different. Hutchins studies Descartes’ explana-
tion of the heartbeat in depth, and his explanations of muscular movement and
nutrition more briefly, to show that his explanations of physiological phenomena
look far more systemic and multi-level than traditionally reductive (Hutchins,
2015, p.65). So we should not be surprised to find great variation in kinds of
mechanistic explanation, and in the kinds of entities and activities they appeal
to.
It is true that grasping a mechanistic explanation, in the sense of knowing
something about entities, activities and their organization by which the phe-
nomenon is produced, may generate a feeling of understanding. But applying
the contextual theory generates further questions. It suggests we turn our atten-
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tion to examining the practices of a community of scientists using a mechanistic
explanation, to assess whether they can use it well for the purposes of the kind
of community-based practice suggested by de Regt and Dieks.
We should expect that it is within the context of the skills involved in that
kind of practice that a community will say a mechanistic explanation has virtues,
and value it as intelligible. Laws and theories skate over parts, and we can see
why CIT, considering mathematically expressed laws, prioritised the skill of
manipulation of equations. Mechanistic explanations may share, presumably,
very general virtues of explanations, such as the visualisability and simplicity
mentioned by de Regt and Dieks (2005). For distinctively mechanistic virtues,
we need to consider the role of identifying parts and what they can do, and
forms of organization, in the uses to which mechanistic explanations are put.
Specifically for supernovae, I will show that one of the uses for which mech-
anistic explanations are recruited is building simulations of the phenomenon
that help us understand it, particularly in application to SN1987A. Information
about mechanisms, rather than just laws, is crucial for building and using such
simulations, because attention to parts is needed. A covering law explanation
in a broadly Hempelian style is not sufficient; instead we see a great deal of
reasoning about entities such as the star core, and activities, particularly the
‘bounce’.
Note that both the approach of MDC to intelligibility and the contextual
theory of understanding indicate that pragmatics will be crucial. Consider:
What is taken to be intelligible (and the different ways of making
things intelligible) changes over time as different fields within science
bottom out their descriptions of mechanisms in different entities and
activities that are taken as, or have come to be, unproblematic. This
suggests quite plausibly that intelligibility is historically constituted
and disciplinarily relative (which is nonetheless consistent with there
being universal general characteristics of intelligibility). (Machamer
et al., 2000, p22.)
MDC seem here to be open to the relativity to a discipline at a time embedded
in the contextual theory.9
This will be particularly clear in mechanistic explanations using bottom-out
entities and activities. Consider:
Bottoming out is relative: Different types of entities and activities
are where a given field stops when constructing mechanisms. The
explanation comes to an end, and description of lower-level mecha-
nisms would be irrelevant to their interests. Also, scientific training
is often concentrated at or around certain levels of mechanisms.’
(Machamer et al., 2000, p.13.)
9I lack space to establish it here, but this seems to me also thoroughly congruent with the
work of Darden (2006), the work of Craver (2007) on the ‘mosaic unity of neuroscience’, and,
especially, Bechtel’s current work building on Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010).
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This last idea is developed in some detail in Glennan (2017).
I will go on now to develop this account with respect to supernovae, partic-
ularly SN1887A, a Type II supernova, in section 3. I will look at bottom-out
entities and activities, and critically examine MDC’s claims about gaps and
productive continuity.
3 Understanding supernovae
The exact nature of stars, and why some of them explode, has been a major
concern for theoretical development, modelling and the search for observational
data in astrophysics. Astrophysicists seek to identify the different ‘mechanisms
of supernovae’. As argued elsewhere, and further explained below, these expla-
nations broadly fit the view of what mechanisms are that has been developed in
the mechanisms literature (Illari and Williamson, 2012). In brief, mechanisms
of supernovae explain the observed phenomena of ‘new stars’ or brighter stars,
in terms of the activities of entities, such as accumulation of iron at the star
core, their organisation, such as passing the Chandrasekhar limit, and further
activities such as collapse and bounce. To develop my view of mechanistic un-
derstanding, I will now investigate how mechanistic explanations of supernovae
are used, allowing us to understand supernovae. This case is novel as it is un-
usual in both of the literatures or views that I discuss: the mechanisms literature
doesn’t usually look to physics; while the contextual theory has so far focused
on theory.
Within this argument, use will be important in two places. First, I will
show that understanding supernovae is a remarkably complex affair. Stellar
astrophysics seeks to explain multiple things, (including at least the famous ‘H-
R diagram’ I will come to in a moment, main sequence burning, different types
of supernovae, and the peculiarities of an individual supernova), and multiple
things are used (including at least physical theories, stellar structure models, and
mechanisms of supernovae). So I will show quite generally that the contextual
theory needs to expand to consider many things that are used, that are put to
many different uses. And while laws are indeed used to construct explanations,
yielding understanding of phenomena, in this kind of case they are used in
alliance with many other things, including models and mechanistic explanations.
Second, within this surrounding complex architecture, I will examine how
mechanistic explanations are used to generate understanding of supernovae, and
pull out features more distinctive of mechanistic explanations. We will examine
the variety of bottom-out entities and activities for supernovae, and home in on
when a mechanistic explanation is regarded as involving a problem or anomaly:
the neutrino bounce. I will show that this isn’t a ‘gap’ in any simple sense, and
productive continuity is also difficult to see. Nevertheless usable entities, activ-
ities and organisation are needed for an intelligible mechanistic explanation of
supernovae. Further, successful use of mechanistic explanations of supernovae,
i.e. understanding supernovae, requires the surrounding architecture of laws
and models and the various practices which use them. We will also see that un-
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derstanding supernovae is an immensely creative activity, in the sense developed
by Bailer-Jones (1999) with respect to extragalactic radio sources.
Within this surrounding architecture, mechanistic explanation has a special
place in understanding supernovae. Nevertheless, I will argue that there is no
serious question of mechanistic explanation versus laws explanation for under-
standing supernovae. The two are deeply interdependent, not in competition.
Physical law is vital (some but not all of the laws used are candidates for ‘funda-
mental’ physical law, if there is such a thing), as is its application to particular
entities and their activities and organisation. We would have no understanding
of stars without fundamental theory - and no fundamental theory, much less
intelligible fundamental theory, without cases like this that require a complex
architecture of modelling, simulation, and mechanistic explanations involving
entities, activities and their organisation.
3.1 Stellar structure models
We must begin the story of supernovae with our understanding of stars. This
is not dependent on a particular physical theory of stars. It depends, rather,
on multiple important theories in physics, including at least general relativity,
quantum field theory, thermodynamics, and theories of light - or more generally
radiative transfer. Chemistry is also important to stellar evolution.10 In so
far as there is a ‘theory’ particular to stars, this consists in stellar structure
models. These each consist of a cluster of equations describing the crucial
elements of stars, and are used to explain their various properties, including
the evolution of their burning. Crudely, each equation is designed to model a
particular factor affecting stars, perhaps, in the simplest models, one governing
dynamical or structural changes, one governing thermal changes, and one the
nuclear processes (all of which characteristically operate on different timescales
and draw on different background theories), so that when the equations are
solved simultaneously, or simulated, the interactions between these factors can
be effectively seen. Considerable simplifying assumptions are typically used,
such as treating stars as isolated; that they have a uniform initial composition
(70% hydrogen, 25-30% helium, and trace amounts of heavier elements); and
that they are spherically symmetric. Note that this work is needed to get
theories to successfully describe a particular kind of entity.
A crucial and lengthy activity of that entity is main sequence burning. Un-
derstanding that has been a major achievement of the use of physical theory to
build stellar structure models. A striking example of explanatory success is ex-
plaining features of the Herztsprung-Russell (H-R) diagram, which summarises
observations of stars. If a cluster of observed stars are plotted on a diagram
where one axis is decreasing surface temperature, and the other axis is the lumi-
nosity, this produces a characteristic scattering of the stars.11 [Insert Figure 1:
10I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to include this.
11This is an endlessly reproduced diagram, including various levels of detail. See Prialnik
(2010, p9ff) for a textbook presentation. It is also available openly in many places on the
internet. For example, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hertzsprung-Russell_diagram.
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Schematic H-R Diagram.] The idea in a nutshell is that, first, stellar structure
models explain why stars in main sequence burning are located on the central
diagonal according to their initial mass, and that is why most of the stars we
observe lie on that; secondly, stellar structure models alongside the mechanisms
of supernovae explain the features of some stars that lie off that line, and why
there are so few of them, as supernovae happen much faster than main sequence
burning; thirdly, both of these explain that, although there are probably many
white dwarfs, they should be very difficult to detect, so few will show on the
diagram. Other massive stars do also show. The H-R diagram is a highly pro-
cessed summary of empirical evidence concerning stars, but, nevertheless, one
major unifying use of stellar structure models is to explain this diagram, which
thereby offers significant support for stellar structure models.
This, then, is a brief summary of how stellar astrophysics uses physical
theory to generate a cluster of models which helps explain what stars are, and
their key activity of main sequence burning.
3.2 Mechanisms of supernovae
Stellar structure models are also used to work out what will happen at the end
of the life of a star, after main sequence burning exhausts the nuclear fuel which
has been the source of energy supporting the star against gravitational collapse.
There are two major types of mechanism of supernovae now generally ac-
cepted: type I and type II (with subspecies type Ia, Ib and Ic; see also Murdin
(1993)). However, we will begin with type II, also called ‘core collapse’ or ‘iron
disintegration’ supernovae. This only happens to high mass stars, much bigger
than our sun. In brief, the iron cores of massive stars which have exhausted
their nuclear fuel become too large to withstand gravity and collapse, releasing
an enormous amount of gravitational potential energy, which is carried away,
primarily by neutrinos, igniting nuclear burning in the envelope which contains
the rest of the mass of the star.12
During their main sequence life, stars burn hydrogen, and their composition
is approximately homogenous: 70% hydrogen, most of the rest helium with
small amounts of heavier elements. The centre of the star is hotter and denser
due to gravity, so hydrogen burning is more intense in the core. As hydrogen
nears exhaustion, things change and the core becomes increasingly differentiated
from the rest of the star. A hydrogen-exhausted helium core grows gradually in
mass, as hydrogen burning continues in a shell around that core. The helium
core contracts, while the envelope (the rest of the mass of the star) expands
in response to maintain energy equilibrium. On contraction, the core heats
up, which triggers the next round of burning, and this process repeats through
helium, then carbon, oxygen and silicon burning, until eventually the core of
the star is iron, gradually increasing in mass.
12The precise mechanism of type II supernovae remains controversial, but they are asso-
ciated with neutrino bursts. I focus on the state of the art in 1987, surrounding work on
SN1987A. See McCray (1997).
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Iron can no longer undergo nuclear burning to release energy that can sup-
port the core against gravity, because making iron into a heavier element takes
up energy rather than releasing it. Ultimately an iron core that can no longer
undergo nuclear burning can only be supported by what is called ‘electron de-
generacy pressure’, and modeling this is where quantum mechanics becomes
essential. Electrons are fermions and so must obey Pauli’s exclusion principle,
which means that only two electrons (one spin up, one spin down) can occupy
the lowest energy state, and only two the next, and so on, so that high lying
energy states need to be filled. Some electrons must therefore be quite high en-
ergy, and this creates pressure, the electron degeneracy pressure which supports
the star core. However, in 1931 Chandrasekhar calculated the upper limit to
the mass of stars that can be supported by electron degeneracy pressure. It is
known as the Chandrasekhar limit and is about 1.46M
⊙
, i.e. 1.46 solar masses
or 1.46 times the mass of the sun, although collapse can begin sooner, depending
on the star’s rotation.
When the iron core passes the Chandrasekhar limit, it collapses rapidly,
through various phases. Ultimately the iron nuclei break back into protons and
neutrons, and the free protons capture free electrons and turn into neutrons,
each releasing a neutrino. As long as the total mass is still below the Tolman-
Oppenheimer-Volkoff limit, neutron degeneracy pressure can halt the collapse,
forming a neutron star which is basically one huge nucleus, about 20km or so
in diameter. The infalling envelope of the star bounces off this incredibly dense
matter, and the released neutrinos blast out of the core during the bounce, the
whole carrying off a vast amount of energy, and also blasting away much of
the envelope, igniting nuclear burning there. If the star is symmetrical, this
explosion should be symmetrical, but we will see shortly, regarding SN1987A,
that this is not always so.
With the mechanism for type II supernovae agreed, it is much easier to ex-
plain type Ia supernovae. Smaller stars such as our sun, which are much less
massive, will not undergo core collapse as the entire star has less mass than the
Chandrasekhar limit. Instead, such stars collapse to form white dwarfs after the
end of nuclear burning, but these remain small enough to be supported against
gravitational collapse by electron degeneracy pressure while they still contain
some usable nuclear fuel, such as carbon and oxygen, and the star does not
collapse far enough to heat up enough to ignite their burning and so exhaust
available nuclear fuel. Unlike our sun, many stars are not isolated, but exist in
binary star systems, which characteristically involve the two stars exchanging
mass. Type Ia supernovae result when a white dwarf remnant is tipped over
the Chandrasekhar limit by accreting material from a binary companion star.
Collapse begins while the star still contains nuclear material, significantly heat-
ing the core, and thereby triggering runaway nuclear reactions in the remaining
nuclear material which blow the star completely apart, leaving no remnant.
These two types of supernovae are different kinds of explosions of star cores
with different compositions, depending crucially on the Chandrasekhar mass.
One major empirical reason to support these two separate mechanisms is that
there are two distinctively different kinds of ‘light curves’ generated when we
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observe and plot light and other radiation received on earth from supernovae:
intensity of light emitted over time and elements found in the spectra. Indeed,
the distinction between type Ia and type II supernovae began as a purely phe-
nomenal one, mostly in terms of the presence of hydrogen lines in the spectra
of type II supernovae, but not of type I. But this distinction is now agreed to
match these two kinds of mechanisms. This agreement is so established that
type Ia supernovae are now used as ‘standard candles’ to calculate such things as
the distances to galaxies, and ultimately the speed of expansion of the universe.
Since type Ia supernovae occur at approximately the same mass as each other,
they should have approximately the same luminosity at source, so a dimmer
type Ia supernova must be further away from us. Mechanisms of supernovae
have become a vital tool in astrophysics.
Notice three things about this understanding of supernovae. First, it is
generated by focusing on entities and activities and their organisation, most
obviously the star core (entity), the ‘collapse’ and ‘bounce’ (activities) and the
critical place of the Chandrasekhar limit (organisation). Second, it is deeply
dependent on the understanding gained by building stellar structure models.
We begin to model supernovae by realising that various assumptions that hold
during main sequence burning will no longer hold. Most notably, the star does
not remain approximately homogeneous, nor does the proportion of gases in the
star continue to remain roughly constant. Instead, heavier elements begin to
accrue at the star core. Relaxing the assumptions of homogeneity and allowing
the proportion of elements to change allows for the simulation of explosions, as
we will see in section 3.3. Finally, our understanding of supernovae draws on
physical theory to solve problems, to allow us to model entities, and calculate
possible activities - in ways that can then be built into simulations. This is
clearly seen in the use of Pauli’s exclusion principle to explain electron degen-
eracy pressure, and help to calculate the Chandrasekhar limit. These activities
are organised and coordinated, but this does not mean that they are not cre-
ative. Bailer-Jones shows that this is possible by showing how visualisations
were used to put sub-models back together in a coordinated but creative way
to model extended extragalactic radio sources (Bailer-Jones, 1999, p384ff).
It is generally agreed in the current mechanisms literature that a mecha-
nism’s activities and entities are not something decided in advance of investiga-
tion, but are chosen in the process of mechanism discovery. There is therefore no
bar to a mechanistic explanation including such wildly divergent entities as ‘elec-
trons’, ‘a Fermi sea’, and ‘a star’s core’; and such imaginative organisation and
activities as ‘passing the Chandrasekhar limit’ and ‘collapsing’. It is a slightly
different thing how entities and activities are chosen that require no further
explanation. Recall from section 2 that MDC call such entities and activities
‘bottom-out’, which means they are regarded as unproblematic by a particular
field at a particular time. So long as the explanations of supernovae bottom
out in entities and activities that are regarded by astrophysicists as unproblem-
atic, then the mechanistic explanation will also be regarded by astrophysicists
as intelligible.
In the discussion above we can see this in how electron degeneracy pres-
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sure is important in answering the mystery of how a neutron star is supported
against gravity when it cannot be by nuclear burning. Pauli’s exclusion prin-
ciple is regarded as unproblematic to astrophysics, although that is not true in
other areas of physics. There are still complications, however, because what is
regarded as unproblematic changes over time. We will see in section 3.3 when
something is problematic, how that changes, and how that is related to ‘gaps’
in mechanistic explanations.
Recall that I said at the beginning of section 3 that use would prove to be
important to understanding supernovae in two main ways. These should now
have begun to become clearer as the full complexity of our understanding of
supernovae is emerging. The ability of scientists to generate mechanisms of su-
pernovae is dependent on physical theory, and stellar structure models, which
are used to generate mechanistic explanations of different types of supernovae
consistent with two distinct empirically observed phenomena. The mechanis-
tic explanations of both major types of supernovae remain embedded in this
context, allowing among other things the use of type Ia supernovae as standard
candles. This shows that mechanistic explanations of supernovae depend at least
on our ability to use fundamental physical theory and to build and use stellar
structure models—modifying their assumptions for the end of a star’s life. Laws
explanation and mechanistic explanation are not in competition, but interde-
pendent and embedded also in other scientific practices. What we know about
the entities and activities of stars is used to adapt models, make simulations,
and work out which laws to apply and how.
This means that the first place in which use is important is in the myriad
of uses of myriad scientific creations to understand supernovae. The contextual
theory of scientific explanation needs to expand, even in its account of how laws
are used to understand phenomena, to allow that laws are used alongside many
other things like models and mechanistic explanations in this case and cases
like it. Happily it seems the contextual theory has the resources to do this. I
began that setup in sections 2.2 and 2.3, but here we can see that the main
claims of the contextual theory seem to be right: that use is important, and
that these uses are essential to the epistemic aims of science, rather than a mere
afterthought.
The second place in which use is important shows when we home in on
how the mechanistic explanations are used in understanding supernovae. This
case is not really a case where there are different explanations of supernovae,
and the mechanistic explanation is distinct in kind from the others. Instead, it
is not clear this understanding could be achieved any other way; mechanistic
explanation is a part, but an important part, of the wider architecture of laws
and stellar structure models used to understand stars. General physical theory
is important, but cannot be used alone. The process of getting it to apply to
the special entity ‘star’, is itself an immensely creative empirically informed
endeavour. We have to turn to trying to model the parts, in accord with such
empirical data as we can gather. Mechanistic explanation is essential to the
process. We will see shortly an instance of such a mechanistic explanation
achieving success in deepening our understanding of type II supernovae.
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Within this architecture of laws, models, and mechanisms, I suggest that
these combinations of uses constitute understanding of various phenomena,
rather than just identifying when understanding occurs, or offering a test for
it. Unlike a purely subjective feeling of understanding of the kind criticised by
Trout, these uses can explain why we value understanding, because they exist
when an explanation is fruitful, as de Regt says. These uses may be accompa-
nied by phenomenology, but any such phenomenology is not the whole story.
Further, it is becoming increasingly clear how deeply intertwined explanation
and understanding are. In the kinds of cases that de Regt and Dieks originally
consider, it is possible for scientists to know a theory, and only later come to de-
velop the skills to use it, and so have understanding. But having an explanation
and using it are far harder to separate in a practice such as stellar astrophysics.
Analytically we can separate knowing a mechanistic explanation and being able
to use it, but in the practice itself these are very difficult to separate. Using the
explanation is often part of how we get it, and it is always involved in developing
and improving an existing explanation.
The next section will examine how we take a general model of a stable entity
and build a simulation of a particular explosion, thereby also gaining empirical
evidence for both a crucial piece of the mechanism of type II supernova, and for
particle physics.
3.3 Supernova SN1987A
For various reasons, we have still more work to do to understand an individual
supernova, and I will show that this work is both a vital use of the mecha-
nism of type II supernovae, and crucial to letting empirical evidence impact on
the surrounding architecture of laws and stellar structure models that I have
described.
SN1987A is one of the most important type II supernovae ever observed.
It was the core collapse of a massive star (Sanduleak-69 202, approximately
18M
⊙
) in the Large Magellanic Cloud. It was spotted in 1987, and, while not
in our galaxy, the Large Magellanic Cloud is an unobscured close companion
galaxy, making SN1987A at its time one of the closest supernovae in several
hundred years. It was also the first supernova to be observed with many of our
modern capabilities, including neutrino detectors at Kamiokande and IMB, and
later space telescopes like Hubble and Chandra. It was also the first supernova
where the progenitor star was already known.13 It also had some fascinating
peculiarities that manifested in a non-standard light-curve, and a distinctive
asymmetric squashed-figure-8 shape, and these are still being investigated.
SN1987A is particularly illuminating for our purposes because its most im-
mediate impact was to generate for a time considerable agreement about the
mechanism of type II supernovae. The neutrino blast which had been posited as
the major means of carrying away the energy of collapse was very controversial,
constituting what MDC would probably recognise as a ‘gap’ in the mechanism,
13In 2010 it remained the only such supernova (Prialnik, 2010).
17
or a failure of ‘productive continuity’, and therefore intelligibility. For the first
time scientists were able to detect two bursts of neutrinos from SN1987A, one
each by Kamiokande and IMB (a third burst was reported at the time but later
withdrawn). This generated significant consensus in the astrophysics community
about the role of a neutrino burst. Further, particle physics met astrophysics
as the first detection of neutrinos from such a source energised a great deal of
work on both those bursts and more theoretical understanding of neutrinos in
general (Walker, 1987).
SN1987A also involved other mysteries that are fascinating for our purposes.
That the supernova would be of type II was not a surprise: as Sanduleak-
69 202 is estimated to have begun its life at approximately 20M
⊙
, its core
was very likely to pass the Chandrasekhar limit at some point, in spite of an
estimated 2M
⊙
lost due to stellar winds. However there was significant debate,
particularly from 1987 to 1989, about which was the progenitor star (Fabian
et al., 1987; Joss et al., 1988; Podsiadlowski and Joss, 1989; Chevalier, 1992).
Sanduleak-69 202 was a blue supergiant, and the community was surprised
that it would be ready to explode. Not until the brightness of the supernova
dimmed enough for it to be seen that Sanduleak-69 202 had gone was there
agreement that it was indeed the progenitor. It is thought that SN1987A being
the explosion of a blue supergiant was the main reason for the second mystery,
its non-standard light-curve (Chevalier, 1992).
The final feature of SN1987A I will discuss is its distinctive squashed-figure-8
appearance, composed of a bright central ring and two larger, dimmer, rings.14
[Insert Figure 2: Schematic shape of SN1987A.] To us on Earth, it appeared as
a bright centre, surrounded by an even brighter central ring. This is common
with a supernova, with the centre being thought to be the supernova remnant
lit by radioactive decay, and the ring indicating nuclear burning in the envelope
ignited by the blast. But this ring of SN1987A showed significant asymmetries,
which have been understood using simulations from early years (Papaliolios
et al., 1989). But SN1987A also had two much larger, fainter rings overlapping,
to look from earth like a squashed up figure 8. These are more mysterious, and
were thought to indicate the ends of two cones expanding violently in opposite
directions from the central explosion, showing that there was asymmetry in the
explosion. This has been understood in many ways, most by running supernova
simulations including significant asymmetric effects (Sato et al., 1996). More
recently, they have been suggested to be the result of outflow from the progenitor
while still in its red supergiant phase (de Grijs, 2015).
In these three examples, the mechanism of type II supernovae was used,
but adapted to account for the peculiarities of SN1987A. These uses constitute
understanding of the more general mechanism, while in turn further uses in the
astrophysics of supernovae show understanding of the particular event SN1987A.
So here the mechanism of type II supernovae as so far known was the primary
thing used. It is clear that a general understanding of a kind of supernova,
14Images are widely available. See, for example, Hubble’s image http://www.
spacetelescope.org/images/potw1142a/, or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SN_1987A.
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which was all we had before spotting SN1987A, was applied to understand a
particular phenomenon - a case of type II supernovae that was distinctive in
various ways. But the general mechanism of type II supernova was not used in
a vacuum. First, it was supplemented by filling in a gap. Second, against the
background of laws and stellar structure models, it was used alongside other
things, specifically simulations, to understand why SN1987A appears to us as
it does.
This required modelling what was peculiar about the particular entities and
activities of SN1987A. So simulations were used to explore what kinds of asym-
metries in a star might lead to the kind of asymmetric explosion we seemed to
see, or whether outflow was more likely. Speculation about what kind of star
might have led to such an explosion, with the right kind of light curve, was
also important until it was clear that Sanduleak-69 202 had gone. These uses
were important to help us use the crucial empirical evidence that we got from
SN1987A.
This was particularly important to allow the consensus about the mechanism
of type II supernovae. They had been regarded as a problem because there was
no general agreement prior to 1987 about a crucial activity. We could calculate
the enormous amount of energy which would be released on core collapse, but
there was no consensus about where it went. Missing energy seems to be a clear
failure of productive continuity. It is also an important gap in a mechanism,
when a crucial activity is unknown, even mysterious. Neutrinos are extremely
difficult to detect, and prior to 1987 a neutrino burst was one posited means of
carrying away the energy. But once two different neutrino detectors reported a
neutrino burst from a visible supernova, the community rapidly converged on a
neutrino burst during the bounce as the missing activity that was needed. The
gap that had been regarded as problematic was no more.
It should become clear here that mechanistic explanation, and understanding
phenomena using a mechanistic explanation, are deeply intertwined. Recall that
MDC say that mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how
actually things work. They also say that intelligibility doesn’t require a how-
actually explanation, but merely an elucidative relationship. (Machamer et al.,
2000, p21.) Before 1987, type II supernovae had some possible explanations.
However, in achieving consensus, a gap in the explanation was filled in, and
intelligibility of the mechanism was increased. So, as I noted in section 2.3, in
cases like this we don’t get the explanation, and afterwards work on using it
and understanding the phenomenon. Use of the explanation is already ongoing
in the practice. So here, we improve our explanation, and improve intelligibility
and understanding, together.
This is important, but one of the lessons of SN1987A is that it is very par-
ticular. What a community regards as unproblematic is very dependent on the
state of that community at that time - and very particularly on what else they
know and what tools they have. I am not giving an account of explanation, but
of understanding, and I take the community being able to use the explanation
to be constitutive of understanding. I shall continue to develop this last idea in
the rest of this section.
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The community clearly regarded gaps, or breaks in productive continuity of
this kind, to be a problem, and indeed to impede use. After 1987 they had a
preferred mechanism of type II supernovae that they could use. But note that
I chose this as a clear case. Much of the other work that was done on SN1987A
was very exploratory, and could have led to very different results. At the time,
for example, the non-standard light-curve might have proven to be of a hitherto
unseen type of supernovae. Therefore, much of the empirical data could have
turned out to indicate different gaps or problems of productive continuity.
The lesson for what the virtues of mechanistic explanations are is also one
of particularity. Recall that according to the contextual theory I have been
developing for mechanistic explanations, virtues are projected by scientists onto
mechanistic explanations they can use. We can see here some general virtues
that have been advanced of scientific work in general, including coherence with
other things we know, and fit with empirical data.
However, these virtues show here their very particular facets. Here, coher-
ence with what else we know cannot easily be formalised.15 It involves the
creative embedding in the whole architecture I have described above, where
first physical law is used to make stellar structure models, and then these are
adapted to generate mechanisms of supernovae. Fit with empirical data is ex-
tremely particular, and in some cases such as SN1987A this needs customised
modelling and simulation. Far from being merely ad hoc and overfitted, models
of individual cases are essential. Distinctively mechanistic virtues appear in the
homing in on modelling a particular entity, and a particular instance of an ac-
tivity. And this is the only way to get evidence that bears on the more general
mechanism, as we discover more about what can happen with those kinds of
entities and activities.
This whole process of modelling SN1987A and fitting it into what else we
know about stellar structure models and Type II supernovae is creative as above,
active in the sense of being an ongoing process, and is highly skilled. I take this
to be constitutive of understanding, rejecting the view of understanding as a
phenomenological feeling, where that is construed as something more passively
received. Note what ‘coherence’ and ‘fit’ mean here: a very active and cre-
ative process was required to model SN1987A and fit it into the surrounding
architecture of what we already knew, and also with the empirical data we were
constantly getting from our observations. The multiple tasks involved are highly
skilled and shared across a large community, highly active, not a passive, wholly
subjective feeling. The more distinctively mechanistic virtues include the role
of identifying parts and what they can do, and the identification of forms of
organisation and their place in the explanation of the phenomenon.
15Ruphy (2011) offers us an important warning that models created from this kind of simu-
lation process may exhibit what she calls permanent incompatible pluralism. She writes: ‘And
the point is that those alternative pictures would be equally plausible in the sense that they
would also be consistent both with the observations at hand and with our current theoretical
knowledge.’ (Ruphy, 2011, p184.) Even worse, in some cases this kind of incompatibility
will not be temporary, but permanent, in the sense that we cannot expect the incompatible
plurality to go away when new data come in.
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It would be extremely difficult to extract simple tests of scientists’ under-
standing of these various scientific items. No one particular skill or ability to
use mechanistic explanations of supernovae is likely to indicate understanding
of supernovae in any particularly reliable way. Instead, it seems that the shared
abilities of the community to use the mechanistic explanations of supernovae
in many different ways, embedded in the ability to use other things such as
stellar structure models, constitutes the scientific community understanding su-
pernovae. Many different abilities may indicate understanding on the part of
individual scientists—but that will be a matter for the community to judge. It
seems to me to make no particular sense to try to specify a bar for the un-
derstanding of an individual scientist. Instead, understanding is a multifaceted
thing, had by a community, and any understanding individual scientists have of
type II supernovae, and SN1987A in particular, is dependent upon the skills of
the community.
4 Conclusion
I have developed and defended the views of de Regt and Dieks, to show that
understanding type II supernovae required the use of many different kinds of
things, involving both theoretical and embodied skills, and that the resulting
understanding is primarily the achievement of a community. This use, and so the
understanding that I have claimed it constitutes, is an active and ongoing thing,
an activity of a community, rather than a passive achievement of individuals. It
offers an account of intelligibility of mechanisms which is a useful contribution to
the mechanisms literature, as is the application to the unusual case of SN1987A.
I will finish with some reflections on the contextual theory I have applied.
In de Regt and Dieks’ initial work, CIT as a test, or the ability of scientists to
recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of the theory without per-
forming exact calculations, was important. No doubt many scientists became
comfortable with quantitative models of SN187A, but even this part of their
work did not involve using a single theory, but building many models and sim-
ulations. Even in far more recent work, de Regt still focuses on prediction of
consequences, although he construes it as a skill : ‘I will develop the idea that
understanding phenomena consists in the ability to use a theory to generate
predictions of the target systems behavior.’ (de Regt, 2015, 3781.) It is the
ability, not a correct outcome, which is de Regt’s focus, and I have shown that
this is an important difference.
Further, I have shown that even in the project of using theory to under-
stand a phenomenon, the uses and skills required go far beyond that envisaged
by de Regt and Dieks (2005). To understand supernovae, astrophysicists drew
on physical theory, clusters of stellar structure models constituted by groups
of equations, and built theoretically possible mechanisms of explosion, and in-
creasingly specialised models and simulations ultimately designed for explaining
features of individual stars. In explaining SN1987A simulations were used to
explain features like its asymmetry: in a way that involves reproducing the be-
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haviour, of course, but simulations are much richer than prediction. In stellar
astrophysics generally, new phenomena are even created. In the H-R diagram,
we have the construction of a complex new phenomenon that is explained suc-
cessfully with stellar structure models.16 So the turn towards models since
de Regt (2015) is welcome.
I accepted de Regt and Dieks’ claim that scientific understanding goes sig-
nificantly beyond a purely subjective and possibly individual ‘sense’ of under-
standing of the kind criticised by Trout (2002). Although I hold that such a
sense still could have some important epistemic roles, and noted that according
to current embodied or enactive views of mental states, any sharp dichotomy
between thinking of understanding as a mental state and thinking of it as in-
volving skills is rather artificial. Nevertheless, I have offered even more reason
for rejecting the purely subjective sense of understanding that Trout criticises
as the whole story of understanding. While scientists might also experience phe-
nomenological responses to this achievement, and these activities, feeling that
in using them extensively they have developed a more intuitive grasp of them,
there is a great deal more going on here if we pay attention to use.
I am willing to accept the consequence, which some might find counterintu-
itive, that a scientist could in principle count as understanding a theory even
in the absence of her—or even the whole community—‘feeling’ that they under-
stand it. On this view we might just be disappointed in what we subjectively
wanted when we embarked on a project. This seems to agree with a remark by
Hasok Chang:
‘With these insights, I can finally tackle something that has been an
enduring puzzle to me: what is the difference between simply ap-
plying an algorithm to solve a problem, and doing the same with a
sense of understanding? Simply following an algorithm provides no
relevant understanding to someone who is interested in some other
epistemic activity, for example, visualizing what is going on, or giv-
ing a mechanical explanation. But for someone whose goal is to
derive a prediction, there is surely the relevant sense of understand-
ing in knowing how to apply the right tricks to derive the answer.
(When I was an undergraduate, learning physics in the standard
way gave me no sense of understanding because I went into the en-
terprise expecting something else. It was my mistake to think that
my classmates who were not dissatisfied like me were in some way
shallow or unreflective; they were simply happy with the epistemic
activity they were engaged in.)’ (Chang, 2009, p76.)
I am also happy with the various controversial implications of the view that
I have been noting throughout. Understanding or intelligibility is a value that
the scientific community at a particular time confers on theories, models and
mechanisms that they can use. Understanding is therefore something had by a
community, and only derivatively by individuals. Finally, the complexity of the
16See Boon (2009) for discussion of this in another context.
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multiple uses and skills involved in understanding, and the purposes of theories,
mechanisms and models, means that understanding will rarely if ever be an all-
or-nothing matter. Understanding comes in greater and lesser degrees, and since
it involves multiple skills, it may lie on a multidimensional continuum. That
there are no sharp distinctions here still does not imply that it is an arbitrary
matter.
I wish to finish by raising a concern for the new view. This account sets the
bar for understanding very high, in the sense that only members of the relevant
scientific community will really have access to the training to acquire the the-
oretical skills really needed to use scientific theories, models, and mechanisms.
While the importance of these kinds of skills is crucial, this account would seem
to bar anyone other than active experts from understanding the scientific phe-
nomena we think we have explained. How others understand is not a simple
issue, and I reserve it for further work: roughly, though, I expect that the very
different kinds of uses people outwith the relevant community have for scientific
knowledge might well be key to that story.
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